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Foreign States’ Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Antitrust Cases 
Marek Martyniszyn* 
 
Abstract 
Foreign states’ amicus curiae briefs submitted before the U.S. courts are a special type of pleading. 
This article analyzes such submissions made in U.S. antitrust cases during the period 1978-2015, 
identifying which foreign nations used amicus briefs to present their views and what sort of issues 
attracted their attention. This piece examines also the issue of deference due to such filings, arguing 
that while foreign states’ submissions should be treated respectfully, they do not warrant a 
dispositive effect. Furthermore, this article outlines the practice of filing, explaining the shift from 
diplomatic correspondence towards amicus curiae submissions and the creation of a niche market 
of authoring them. It also indicates general trends in relation to stages of filings and the degree of 
their prevalence. Some broader comments are offered on the functions of foreign nations’ amicus 
filings and their contribution to the on-going development of competition law and policy 
internationally. 
Note: this is the post-peer review version of the article published in 
December 2016 issue of the Antitrust Bulletin. Please refer to the published version: 
Marek Martyniszyn, 'Foreign States’ Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Antitrust Cases', 
61(4) Antitrust Bulletin 611 (2016). 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Antitrust cases involving foreign defendants are not new to the U.S. courts. Some of them relate 
to transnational or purely foreign conduct affecting U.S. markets. Until relatively recently outside 
the U.S. there has been little appetite for and few actual cases of similar transnational enforcement 
of domestic competition laws.1 In effect, the international competition law jurisprudence for a long 
time was shaped in actions before the U.S. courts.  
                                                          
* Lecturer in Law, Queen’s University Belfast, e-mail: m.martyniszyn@qub.ac.uk. The underlying research was conducted on 
a Senior Research Fellowship in the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies at the Loyola University Chicago School of Law. The 
author is grateful to the Institute and its Director—Professor Spencer Weber Waller—for providing stimulating environment, 
generous funding and support. Thanks to Jean Allain, Andre Fiebig, Harry First, Albert Foer, Jerzy Kranz, Imelda Maher, Douglas 
Rosenthal, Sally Wheeler and Spencer Weber Waller for their comments on earlier versions of this article. The author is also 
thankful to Donald I. Baker and Mark R. Joelson for the opportunity to generally discuss foreign states’ amicus submissions at an 
early stage of this project. The usual disclaimer applies. 
1 The terms ‘competition law’, ‘antitrust law’, and ‘antitrust’ are used interchangeably. In many countries competition laws 
were introduced only in the last two decades. Papadopoulos shows that 63 countries adopted competition laws between 1991 and 
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Some of such cases involved active participation of foreign nations by means of amicus curiae 
briefs. An amicus brief is a submission of ‘a person who is not a party to a lawsuit but who petitions 
the court or is requested by the court to file a brief in action because that person has a strong interest 
in the subject matter’.2 Foreign states filed amicus briefs in some of the most controversial 
transnational antitrust cases of the last few decades, such as Matsushita,3 Hartford Fire,4 and 
Empagran.5 In the contexts of these suits the amicus submissions received ample attention (of 
courts, the U.S. government, and commentators), but no attempt was made beforehand to identify 
and look at these filings in general, as a tool in itself.6 It was unclear what informed such 
interventions, why the amicus form was used rather than diplomatic channels, and at what stage 
of the litigation the submissions were filed. The related questions concern the way amicus briefs 
are treated by the courts (including the issue of any deference due to such representations) and 
whether they matter. 
This article makes an original contribution by supplementing the existing gap and casting light 
on foreign nations’ amicus curiae submissions in U.S. antitrust cases. In the period 1978-2015, 67 
foreign nations’ participations by means of amicus briefs in 28 cases have been identified and 
analyzed. The European Commission emerges as the most frequent filer, followed by Canada and 
Japan. Analysis of the briefs indicates a few strands of cases which attracted the attention of foreign 
nations. These were cases dealing with the question of jurisdiction, discoverability of foreign 
leniency-related documents, foreign states’ implication in anticompetitive conduct, and regulation 
                                                          
2000, and 18 states between 2001 and 2008 (by 2008 111 countries had competition laws). ANESTIS S. PAPADOPOULOS, THE 
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF EU COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 16 (CUP 2010). Similarly, Waked provides that while before 
1990 only 10 developing countries had competition laws, by 2007 that number had risen to 77. Dina I. Waked, Do Developing 
Countries Enforce Their Antitrust Laws? A Statistical Study of Public Antitrust Enforcement in Developing Countries, 3 (2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/paper=2044047. That said, regulation of anticompetitive conduct is a very old enterprise and it goes 
back to antiquity. See further ROMAN PIOTROWSKI, CARTELS AND TRUSTS: THEIR ORIGIN AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT FROM THE 
ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS (G. Allen & Unwin 1933). 
2 Bryan A. Garner, et al., Black's Law Dictionary 98 (West Group 9th ed. 2009). 
3 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
4 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
5 F. Hoffmann- La Roche Ltd v. Empagran SA, 542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
6 The literature review reveals that—in the period of the most serious jurisdictional clashes between the U.S. and its allies—
one author wrote about foreign states’ participation in U.S. antitrust cases. See Judith Gelber, Foreign Government Participation 
in United States Antitrust Litigation, 15 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 605 (1981). For general literature on 
amicus filings before the U.S. courts see, for example, Kristen Eichensehr, Foreign Sovereigns as Friends of the Court, 102 
VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW forthcoming (2016); Paul M. Collins, Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW 807 (2004); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, 
The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 743 (2000); Ernest 
Angell, The Amicus Curiae: American Development of English Institutions, 16 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 
QUARTERLY 1017 (1967); Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE LAW JOURNAL 694 
(1962).  
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of natural resources. While foreign nations submit amicus briefs to protect various features of their 
sovereignty and related prerogatives, it cannot be precluded that some submissions are primarily 
motivated by a willingness to shield home businesses from treble damages, which remain an 
internationally contentious and rather unique aspect of U.S. antitrust. 
Foreign nations began communicating directly with U.S. courts due to a change in the 
Supreme Court’s rules relating to such submissions, embraced also by the lower courts. Moreover, 
a few practitioners successfully developed a specific niche market of authoring and facilitating 
amicus filing, arguing that presentation of views by means of amicus submissions may be more 
effective than reliance on diplomatic correspondence. This development might have fueled an 
increasing interest in amicus briefs. Although foreign nations intervene at all stages of litigation, 
filings at the district court level are much more frequent than at higher levels. While typically 
governments file the briefs, submissions made by individual foreign ministries or competition 
agencies point to a new trend. 
Although the extent to which courts actually defer to foreign states’ submissions remains 
unknown, amicus briefs are an important type of pleadings. They can facilitate adjudication, 
especially in cases requiring consideration of foreign laws, procedures and policies. They 
constitute unilateral acts of states and when pertaining to issues of international law, they have the 
capacity to influence its development. Whether submitted out of a genuine sovereignty-related 
concern or being successfully solicited by defense counsel, foreign nations’ amicus submissions 
should not be too easily discounted. Foreign states are no ordinary friends of the court. Courts are 
well-advised to deal with foreign states’ amicus filings in an accommodating and respectful 
manner, even if only to secure similar treatment of the representations made by the U.S. executive 
in foreign fora. 
Part II of this article outlines the scope of the project undertaken. Part III deals with the practice 
of amicus curiae filings. It explains the process towards their judicialization and the 
professionalization of their authoring, and it offers some further comments on stages of filing and 
such briefs’ general prevalence. Part IV lists the identified cases and foreign states’ filings, offering 
analysis in relation to which nations became the friends of the court and what sort of issues 
attracted their attention. This part examines also the question of whether any level of deference is 
due to foreign states’ submissions, and what role the U.S. government plays in such cases. Part V 
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explores the legal and political functions of foreign states’ amicus submissions. The conclusions 
underline the versatile nature of amicus briefs as an instrument and their input into the on-going 
discourse on and development of international and competition law. 
II. The scope of the project  
This article investigates amicus briefs submitted by foreign nations in U.S. antitrust litigation, 
relying on a broad notion of a state encompassing not only governments in the strict sense, but 
also antitrust agencies (regardless of the level of autonomy they enjoy domestically, or the fact 
that they may be supranational, such as the European Commission). Submissions made by foreign 
states’ subdivisions are not included, as they carry a lesser weight in the fields of international law 
and international relations.7 Both formal and de facto amicus briefs are considered. The latter 
category includes statements in forms such as letters sent directly to a court, or documents attached 
to a party’s own filing. Since these materials were considered by courts and drafted for such a 
purpose, they constitute de facto amicus briefs. 
From a temporal perspective, this study focuses on briefs submitted in cases decided between 
1978 and 2015. In 1978 an important policy change took place. Foreign nations were invited to 
communicate any concerns in relation to cases pending before the U.S court directly to them. 8 
Pfizer,9 decided by the Supreme Court in 1978, is the first case included in this study. Although 
preceding the formal policy change, Pfizer nevertheless demonstrates this approach with the 
German government filing an amicus brief directly before the Supreme Court. Motorola Mobility,10 
decided in early 2015, is the last case included. 
A ‘case’ is understood as encompassing all instances of the litigation in a particular dispute. 
For example, Hartford Fire11 is counted as one case, although the UK submitted amicus briefs both 
at the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court levels. Similarly, all instances of presentation of 
views by the foreign state in the same case (as defined above) are counted as one participation. For 
                                                          
7 Such filings are relatively rare but not unusual. For example, the Canadian province of Saskatchewan submitted an amicus 
brief before the Supreme Court on a petition for a writ of certiorari in Minn-Chem. Brief for Amicus Curiae Her Majesty the Queen 
in Right of the Province of Saskatchewan, Canada, in Support of Petitioners, Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium, Inc., 2012 WL 6706582 
(December 26, 2012). 
8 See Section III.1. 
9 Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978). 
10 Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2015). 
11 Hartford Fire, supra n 4. 
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instance, although China submitted numerous statements in Vitamin C,12 these are considered as 
one foreign nation’s participation. Moreover, while there were some instances of joint amicus 
filings by foreign states, for the purpose of this research involvement of a particular state in a 
particular litigation is counted as one participation, irrespective of whether the representation was 
made by means of a brief filed singly or jointly.  
III. The practice of filing 
1. From dyplomacy to judicialization  
Traditionally, a foreign state when interested in bringing its views to the attention of a U.S. court 
regarding pending litigation would follow formal channels of inter-state communication. It would 
direct its diplomatic personnel accredited in the forum to pass on its views on the matter to the 
U.S. Department of State in the form of a diplomatic note (sometimes entitled a Note Verbale or 
Aide Mémoire). It would request that the note be passed to the court hearing the case.13 
In the U.S. this practice changed in 1978. The direct stimulus came from Zenith Radio Corp. 
v. U.S.,14 a case concerning authorization of a levy of countervailing duties on some Japanese 
imports to the U.S. When the case was pending before the Supreme Court, Japan and the delegation 
of the European Commission expressed their views on the matter in diplomatic notes, which—in 
line with the prevailing practice—were addressed to the State Department, requesting their 
transmission to the Supreme Court. The State Department passed the notes to the Solicitor General 
(SG), who in turn handed them on to the Court. The Japanese note supported the U.S. defendant. 
The SG, who presented it to the Court, was prosecuting the case. This led to some confusion in the 
Court. 
While the notes were accepted, the Clerk of the Supreme Court informed the SG that such a 
manner of transmitting notes was not authorized by the Court’s rules. He clarified that foreign 
states should in future make their representations to the Court in line with the Court’s rules. This 
led to a policy change. In August 1978 the State Department informed the Chiefs of Missions in 
                                                          
12 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation 2016 WL 5017312 (2nd Cir. 2016). 
13 For illustrative extracts from such diplomatic notes see, for example, George Winthrop Haight, Extracts from some 
Published Material on Official Protests, Directives, Prohibitions, Comments, etc., 51 INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION 
REPORTS OF CONFERENCES 565 (1964). 
14 Zenith Radio Corp. v. U.S., 437 U.S. 443 (1978). 
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Washington15 that foreign states should file amicus curiae briefs when wishing to communicate 
their views to the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeal in relation to any pending cases.16 The 
U.S. was to consent to such filings in any case in which it is a party. It was underlined that ‘in the 
unlikely event that any other party should decline to consent, the Supreme Court will almost 
certainly grant the motion of a foreign government for leave to file a brief.’17 The State Department 
clarified it would no longer transmit diplomatic notes to courts. Yet, the notes were to remain an 
effective way of communicating foreign states’ views to the U.S. executive. The new policy also 
requested copies of any amicus filings to be sent to the State Department, although it is not clear 
whether this became a practice. 
When the new policy was shaped, in June 1978, the Canadian embassy requested the State 
Department to pass Canadian views in a particular case to the district court hearing it.18 The 
Department refused to do so, informing the embassy that the communication should be submitted 
directly to the court.19 Later the Deputy Legal Adviser explained that while transmitting of 
diplomatic notes to courts was not being precluded, the Department would not expect to do so. 
Any such requests were to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis.20 A decision not to transmit a 
diplomatic note was ‘not to be construed as a negative judgment on the merits of any issues 
raised’.21 
Already under the new policy regime, in relation to Conservation Council22 the Australian 
embassy formally requested the State Department to file a ‘suggestion of interest’ with the court, 
taking a stance on the contentious jurisdictional issue in line with the Australian position. The State 
                                                          
15 The heads of foreign states’ representations (embassies) to the U.S. 
16 The key extracts from the Solicitor General letter to the Legal Advisor of the State Department and the State Department 
diplomatic note addressed to the chiefs of foreign missions in Washington are reprinted in MARIAN LLOYD NASH, DIGEST OF UNITED 
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: 1978 560-63 (Department of State 1980). Even before the policy change some foreign 
nations submitted amicus briefs directly to U.S. courts. For example, shortly before the policy shift, in August 1977, Germany filed 
a brief before the Supreme Court in Pfizer, an antitrust case dealing with the issue of whether a foreign government is ‘a person’ 
within the meaning of Section 4 of the Clayton Act for the purposes of bringing an action for damages. Motion of the Federal 
Republic of Germany for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae and Brief of Amicus Curiae, Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India § 
1977 WL 189363 (1977). 
17 NASH, supra n 16, at 560. 
18 Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied Maintenance Corp., 442 F.Supp. 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). 
19 NASH, supra n 16, at 561-62. 
20 Marian Lloyd Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 73 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 669, 678-79 (1979). 
21 Id. at 679. 
22 Conservation Council of Western Australia, Inc. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 518 F. Supp. 270, 275, n 8 (W.D. Pa. 
1981). 
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Department responded that the case did not involve sufficiently direct or well-defined U.S. 
interests to warrant such filing and recommended Australia to file an amicus brief. 
The new practice explicitly concerned foreign states’ amicus submissions to the Supreme 
Court and the Courts of Appeal. A similar practice was followed before district courts. In 
Matsushita, in 1975—that is before the policy change— a Japanese ministry passed on its views 
to the District Court in a form of a letter transferred through the State Department.23 For some time 
it was unclear, for the court,24 whether the ministry’s views should be considered as views of the 
Japanese government as a sovereign state. In 1980—after the policy change—this issue was 
addressed, in the positive, in a letter sent to the trial court by the Japanese ambassador.25 The 
plaintiffs moved to strike the letter on the grounds that it was not transmitted through diplomatic 
channels.26 The motion was denied. While recognizing that the State Department’s new policy 
explicitly related to presentation of views before the Supreme Court and the Courts of Appeals, 
the Court found that ‘in order to promote consistent practice’ foreign states’ views should be 
communicated directly also to the district courts. Since there is no equivalent of an amicus brief in 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court found the form of a letter entirely appropriate.27 
The change of policy on the proper way of communicating foreign states’ views in cases 
pending before the U.S. courts reflected the growing consensus in the U.S. administration that 
there was no reason (both from international and domestic perspectives) why foreign nations 
should not present their views directly to U.S. courts.28 The new policy allowed the administration 
to remain formally uninvolved. It decreased the political pressure on the U.S. government to take 
a position on a matter involved, judicializing the process. While the administration retains its right 
to intervene if needs be—by filing its own brief—the new policy liberated the executive from the 
need to get involved in every case. It is also a more efficient arrangement, saving the 
administration’s resources without constraining its capacity to act. Foreign states remain free to 
                                                          
23 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., 513 F.Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981). 
24 Id. at 1192, n 121. 
25 The Japanese statement, the ambassador’s letter and other related official correspondence was appended to the Japanese 
brief. See Brief of the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petition for A Writ of Certiorari, Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (Matsushita), No. 83-2004, 1984 WL 565880 (U.S., July 6, 1984). 
26 Alternatively, they asked for its exclusion under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Court found this request to 
be without merits. 
27 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd., supra n 23, at 1192, n 121. 
28 Nash, supra n 20, at 679. 
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use diplomatic channels to lobby the U.S. government to step in, supporting their interests. Since 
the noninvolvement became a default rule, any positive response of the U.S. government to foreign 
states’ requests may be seen as a friendly gesture reinforcing pre-existing relationships and perhaps 
calling for reciprocation by supporting U.S. interests abroad. 
2. Professionalization and authoring of briefs 
The diplomatic notes traditionally filed with the State Department were diplomatic documents. 
Albeit often carrying informed protests, these were rather short and polite statements of concern.29 
The judicialization of the process of presenting foreign states’ views in pending cases30 led also to 
a change of format and style. The amicus briefs became often well-researched and structured 
pieces of legal writing, containing developed argumentation and including appropriate references 
to relevant primary (both foreign and U.S. case law and legislation) and secondary sources. They 
began to resemble more journal articles (also in terms of length) than previously used diplomatic 
notes. This change was positive as courts are better equipped to deal with legal writing than with 
diplomatic statements, and their main function is adjudication, not diplomacy. 
The new policy on presentation of foreign states’ views in the form of amicus briefs also 
triggered professionalization of authoring. The policy effectively required hiring local legal 
counsel. This allowed for the creation of a niche amicus authoring and facilitating market. It can 
be argued that the market was developed by two practitioners—Mark R. Joelson and Joseph P. 
Griffin from Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, a Washington-based law firm. They represented 
interests of the UK31 and Australia from the mid-70s until the late 90s in cases before the U.S. 
courts, including in such important litigations as Uranium,32 Matsushita,33 and Hartford Fire.34 In 
the earlier part of that period the UK was the most active amicus filer (among foreign states), and 
                                                          
29 For example, Germany filed a Note Verbale with the State Department in relation to a proper relief for Clayton Act violations 
by a U.S. subsidiary of a German car maker. Besides voicing German concerns the note contained the following passages: ‘The 
Embassy has of course no intention to influence the determination of American courts on matters within their competence and 
therefore limits comment to the proposal mentioned above… The Embassy repeats that it has no desire to interfere in a pending 
procedure before American courts. It would however be grateful if the above mentioned arguments could be brought to the attention 
of the appropriate authorities.’ Reprinted in Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 353 F.Supp. 1219, 1226 (C.D. Cal. 
1979). 
30 See Section III.1.  
31 Joelson was later accorded the Order of the British Empire (OBE) by the Queen for his service to the UK. See 
https://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/joelson-mark-ren.cfm#. 
32 In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). 
33 Matsushita, supra n 3. 
34 Hartford Fire, supra n 4. 
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in this sense Joelson and Griffin developed the market. They also filed the first ever joint amicus 
of foreign nations, in Matsushita.35 Douglas Rosenthal—the former Chief of Foreign Commerce 
Section of the DoJ’s Antitrust Division, later partner in Coudert Brothers, then in Sonnenschein 
Nath & Rosenthal and finally in Constantine Cannon law firms —is another practitioner, whose 
name recurs on the list of foreign states’ amicus counsel. For instance, Rosenthal represented 
interests of Canada in Hartford Fire36 and of Japan in the Empagran37 and Monosodium 
Glutamate38 litigations. 
These attorneys had and further developed significant expertise in issues on the interface of 
antitrust and international commerce. They were a natural port of call for foreign nations wishing 
to have their views well-represented before U.S. courts. Apart from these three practitioners the 
servicing of briefs largely varied, also in terms of hired law firms. 
One strand of cases capturing foreign nations’ attention concerned the issue of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. After this issue in the antitrust context was, at least tentatively, resolved in 
Empagran,39 numerous foreign nations continued to challenge U.S. extraterritorial assertions, 
albeit now in relation to the Alien Tort Statute’s cases.40 The UK became most active. Its interests 
are represented by Donald I. Baker. Baker is a former acting-head of the DoJ’s Antitrust Division. 
Earlier in the career, when he was an Assistant Attorney General, Baker was one of the co-authors 
of the U.S. amicus brief in Pfizer. In 2005 Baker co-founded Baker & Miller, a law firm 
specializing in competition law and policy as well as in issues of international law. He seems to 
have taken over facilitating amicus filings of the the UK, after Joelson and Griffin retired.41 It is 
noteworthy that some of the arguments regarding extraterritoriality furthered by joined foreign 
                                                          
35 Matsushita, supra n 3. 
36 Rosenthal provided antitrust and international legal advice to the government of Canada for twenty years. See 
http://www.constantinecannon.com/attorneys/drosenthal.php. 
37 Empagran, supra n 5. See n 95. 
38 In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litigation, 477 F.3d 535 (8th Cir. 2007). 
39 Empagran, supra n 5. See n 95. 
40 See discussions in Julian G. Ku, Kiobel and the Surprising Death of Universal Jurisdiction Under the Alien Tort Statute, 107 
THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 835 (2013); Alan O Sykes, Corporate Liability for Extraterritorial Torts Under 
the Alien Tort Statute and Beyond: An Economic Analysis, 100 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 2161 (2011); William S Dodge, Alien 
Tort Litigation: The Road Not Taken, 89 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 1577 (2014). 
41 Baker also represented other governments, acting as a counsel on numerous joined amicus submissions involving the UK. 
For example, he represented the UK and Australia in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) and in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 550 
F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) and the UK and the Netherlands in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). 
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states amici in Empagran42 (as well as the way they were developed) were very similar to those 
presented at around the same time by the joined foreign states amici (Australia, the UK, and 
Switzerland) in Sosa,43 in which case foreign amici were represented by Baker. 
3. Solo v joint submissions 
Amicus briefs can be submitted singly (by one state) or jointly (by numerous states). The latter is 
a rarer practice, but a joint submission may be seen as carrying a greater weight than separate 
filings, since it represents a common position. This is especially so when the brief deals with points 
of international law, which are shaped by state practice.44 
The first joint foreign states’ amicus submitted before the U.S. courts (in any field of law) was 
the brief of four governments—Australia, Canada, France and the UK45—submitted to the 
Supreme Court in Matsushita.46 Interestingly, unlike the Japanese submissions in this case, the 
joint brief did not deal with the subject-matter of the case. It focused on the issue of deference due 
to foreign states’ amicus submissions.47 The broadest in authorship—in an antitrust case—was the 
joint brief submitted by five governments—Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and 
the UK48—on remand in Empagran.49 In that case foreign states submitted also two other joint 
briefs to the Supreme Court (see Table 1 below). But for these four joint briefs, in Matsushita50 
and Empagran,51 no other joint foreign states’ amicus submissions in antitrust cases were 
identified.  
                                                          
42 Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners, F. Hoffmann- La Roche Ltd v. Empagran SA, 2004 WL 226597 (U.S. 2004). Compare Brief of 
the Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Japan, the Swiss Confederation, and the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees in F. Hoffmann- La Roche Ltd v. Empagran SA 
(Empagran II), 2005 WL 3873712 (C.A.D.C. 2005). 
43 Brief of the Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Swiss Confederation and the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, Nos. 03-339, 03-485 (U.S. January 
23, 2004). 
44 See below notes 175-180, 183 and accompanying text.  
45 Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Brief of the Governments of Australia, Canada, France, and the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. 
Zenith Radio Corp. (Matsushita), 1985 WL 669665 (U.S. 1985). 
46 Matsushita, supra n 3. 
47 For discussion see below notes 127-132 and accompanying text.  
48 Brief of the Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Japan, the Swiss 
Confederation, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees in F. Hoffmann- La 
Roche Ltd v. Empagran SA (Empagran II), supra n 42. 
49 F. Hoffmann- La Roche Ltd v. Empagran SA (Empagran II), 417 F.3d 1267 (C.A.D.C. 2005). 
50 Matsushita, supra n 3. 
51 F. Hoffmann- La Roche Ltd v. Empagran SA (Empagran II), supra n 49. 
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Despite raising similar arguments foreign governments often submit amicus briefs singly. 
That was the case, for example, in Spectrum Stores,52 in which numerous foreign states made 
individual filings, while raising very similar arguments.  
Table 1 Foreign States and the U.S. Amicus Curiae Briefs in Empagran  
 
4. Stages of amicus filings and their general prevalence  
There are two noticeable general trends pertaining to foreign nations’ amicus filings. First, 
although in the examined cases foreign states filed amicus briefs at all stages of litigation (see 
Table 2 below), filings made at the district court level were most frequent. This may be seen as 
rather unexpected, especially given that the U.S. government rarely files amicus briefs in the lower 
courts. The early engagement has the benefit of informing adjudication early on, potentially 
influencing the litigation so as to avoid reaching any contentious outcomes. Additionally, the more 
recent amicus submissions by foreign antitrust agencies often concerned discovery, hence a matter 
dealt with at the early stage of litigation. 
Second, the new millennium marks a growing number of foreign states’ amicus filings, as 
compared to the earlier period (nine cases involving 18 instances of foreign nations’ amicus 
participation prior to 2000 versus 19 cases with 49 instances of foreign states’ amicus participation 
since then). The increasing foreign nations’ participation seems to reflect the general growth in 
transnational antitrust cases as well as the rising interest worldwide in regulating private 
anticompetitive conduct. In relation to the latter, one should note that from the beginning of the 
                                                          
52 Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 632 F.3d 938 (5th Cir. 2011). 
Briefs submitted 
before the Supreme 
Court
• Supporting the petition for a writ of certiorari
• Brief of Germany
• Submitted at the merits stage
• Joint brief of Germany and Belgium
• Brief of Canada
• Brief of Japan
• Joint brief of the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands
Briefs submitted 
before the Court of 
Appeals on Remand
• Joint brief of Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, Switzerland, 
and the UK
• Brief of Canada
12 
 
new millennium antitrust agencies from a significant number of countries (at present, over 130 
jurisdictions) began cooperating informally within the framework of the virtual International 
Competition Network, disseminating knowhow and good practices.53 This platform of cooperation 
helps to build trust between regimes. By doing so, it may be also, albeit inadvertently, encouraging 
foreign nations to file amicus briefs in the U.S. courts with the hope that U.S. courts will be as 
receptive and sensitive to arguments as the U.S. officials taking part in the working of the ICN. 
Overall, these phenomena mean that transnational enforcement in the U.S. is now more likely to 
be of particular interest in foreign capitals. This trend is likely to continue and one should expect 
more foreign nations’ amicus filings in the U.S courts in the future.  
Table 2 Amicus Filings at Different Stages of Litigation    
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No Year Case Name 
1 1978 Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India          
2 1980 In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation         
3 1981 Conservation Council of Western Australia, Inc. v. Alcoa          
4 1983 Washington Public Power Supply System v. Western Nuclear      
5 1986 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.        
6 1990 Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. U.S. Golf Ass'n      
7 1993 Rivendell Forest Products Ltd. v. Canadian Forest Products Ltd.          
8 1994 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California         
9 1997 US v. Nippon Paper Industries Co.          
10 2002 In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation      
11 2002 In re: Methionine Antitrust Litigation          
12 2003 Prewitt Enterprises, Inc. v. OPEC         
13 2004 F. Hoffmann- La Roche Ltd v. Empagran         
14 2004 In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation          
15 2004 Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices Inc.          
16 2005 U.S. v. Gosselin World Wide Moving, N.V.     *     
17 2006 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. U.S.     *     
18 2007 In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litigation          
19 2007 In re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litigation          
20 2007 Goss Intern. Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen AG          
21 2008 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation         
                                                          
53 For discussion from various perspectives see Paul Lugard, The International Competition Network at Ten: Origins, 
Accomplishments and Aspirations (Intersentia 2011). 
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22 2008 In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litigation      
23 2010 In re Payment Card Interchange Fee Antitrust Litigation          
24 2011 Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.         
25 2011 In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation          
26 2011 In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation      
27 2012 In re Flat Glass II Antitrust Litigation      
28 2015 Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp.      
 * Brief filed in support of petitions for the grant of certiorari. The writ was not granted. 
 
IV. Analyzing the briefs 
The identification of antitrust cases in which foreign nations submitted amicus briefs is one of the 
original contributions of this research.54 No other similar listing existed before or was publicly 
available. Although the amicus briefs, unless filed under seal, are public documents, this does not 
translate into ease of access, which is hindered by lack of comprehensiveness of the legal research 
databases, especially regarding the district courts level and also, in general, older cases.55 Some of 
the older filings are retrievable through the U.S. National Archives56 or were reprinted in secondary 
sources.  
In the analysed period (1978-2015) 28 cases were identified (see Table 3 below). There were 
in total 67 instances of foreign states’ amicus curiae participations. The number of cases represents 
only a fraction of all transnational cases decided by the U.S. courts.57 While the collected data is 
not dispositive, it is suggestive. Spectrum Stores58 is the case with the highest number of foreign 
nations’ amicus participations (13 states filed briefs). 
                                                          
54 The presented listing was composed after analysing judgements (and dockets), available online, in antitrust cases involving 
transnational elements. Three leading legal databases were used: BlumbergLaw, LexisNexis and Westlaw. Members of the U.S. 
and International Advisory Boards of the Institute for Consumer Antitrust Studies at the Loyola University Chicago were consulted 
about the list in a crowd-sourcing exercise. Although every effort was made to identify all relevant briefs, the list is likely to 
undercount them, especially those filed in the earlier part of the analysed period. 
55 Similar limitations apply to the Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) system. PACER is not a unified 
database. Each court maintains its own holdings. Available filings range from copies of docket lists to copies of some or all briefs. 
PACER covers only up to the last fifteen years. 
56 Courts hand over older case files to the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), some of which are 
retained. None are being digitalized. NARA has numerous branches in the U.S. The holdings are available only locally and there 
are no inter-branch loans. 
57 It is unclear how many such cases were decided in that period. 
58 Spectrum Stores, supra n 52. 
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Table 3 List of identified antitrust cases in which foreign states' filed amicus briefs (1978-2015). 
No Year Case Name Citation 
Foreign States which filed amicus briefs before 
the District Court 
the Court of 
Appeals 
the Supreme Court 
1 1978 Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India 434 U.S. 308 - - Germany 
2 1980 In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation 617 F.2d 1248 
Australia, Canada, 
South Africa, 
Switzerland 
Australia, Canada, 
South Africa, UK 
- 
3 1981 Conservation Council of Western Australia, Inc. v. Alcoa 518 F.Supp. 270 Australia - - 
4 1983 Washington Public Power Supply System v. Western Nuclear 
No. C81-1362M 
(W.D. Wash., 1983) 
UK - - 
5 1986 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 475 U.S. 574 Japan - 
Australia, Canada, 
France, Japan, UK 
6 1990 Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. U.S. Golf Ass'n 728 F.Supp. 1429 UK - - 
7 1993 
Rivendell Forest Products Ltd. v. Canadian Forest Products 
Ltd. 
810 F.Supp. 1116 Canada - - 
8 1994 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California 509 U.S. 764 - UK Canada, UK 
9 1997 US v. Nippon Paper Industries Co. 109 F.3d 1 - Japan - 
10 2002 In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation 2002 WL 34499542 
EC, Australian 
ACCC†, Canada 
- - 
11 2002 In re: Methionine Antitrust Litigation 
2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 27122 
EC - - 
12 2003 Prewitt Enterprises, Inc. v. OPEC 353 F.3d 916 
Austria, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, 
Nigeria, Mexico 
Austria, Mexico, 
Nigeria, 
Saudi Arabia, 
Venezuela 
- 
13 2004 F. Hoffmann- La Roche Ltd v. Empagran  542 U.S. 155 - 
Canada, Germany, 
Japan, the 
Netherlands, 
Switzerland, UK 
(all submitted on 
remand) 
Belgium, Canada, 
Germany, Ireland, 
Japan, 
the Netherlands, UK 
14 2004 In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation 358 F.3d 288 - Germany - 
15 2004 Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices Inc. 542 U.S. 241 - - EC 
16 2005 U.S. v. Gosselin World Wide Moving, N.V. 411 F.3d 502 - - Belgium* 
17 2006 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. U.S. 442 F.3d 177 - - Luxembourg* 
18 2007 In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litigation 477 F.3d 535 - Japan - 
19 2007 In re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litigation 486 F.Supp.2d 1078 EC - - 
20 2007 Goss Intern. Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen AG 491 F.3d 355 - Japan - 
21 2008 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation 584 F. Supp. 2d 546 China China - 
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22 2008 In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litigation 2008 WL 4960194 Canada - - 
23 2010 In re Payment Card Interchange Fee Antitrust Litigation 2010 WL 3420517 EC - - 
24 2011 Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. 632 F.3d 938 
Algeria, Angola, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Norway, 
Qatar, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, Venezuela 
Algeria, Indonesia, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Qatar, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, 
United Arab 
Emirates, Venezuela 
- 
25 2011 In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation 2011 WL 723571 EC, JFTC - - 
26 2011 In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation 2011 WL 2909162 EC - - 
27 2012 In re Flat Glass II Antitrust Litigation 2012 WL 5383346 EC - - 
28 2015 Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. 773 F.3d 826 Japan 
Japan, Taiwan, 
KFTC, Belgian NCA 
- 
 
† Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) did not file a formal amicus brief. The defendants submitted an affidavit of ACCC’s Chief Executive 
Officer. Since this was a statement created for the purposes of that litigation, it is as a de facto amicus brief. 
* Brief filed in support of petitions for the grant of certiorari. The writ was not granted.
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While foreign states’ amicus briefs are rare, they are becoming more frequent. In the first two 
decades of the analysed period transnational antitrust cases were quite sporadic. If one looks at the 
public enforcement efforts then, international cartels—arguably the most common transnational 
antitrust violation—became a central focus of the DoJ Antitrust Division only in 1996.60 
Beforehand, the prosecutions involving foreign firms were less frequent, reflecting the general 
retrenchment of antitrust enforcement in the Reagan administration (1981-1989).61 In 1991 only 
one percent of all corporate defendants in cases brought by the Division were foreign. In the period 
1987-1990 the Division did not bring any case against a foreign entity,62 whereas in the 1990s the 
U.S. authorities successfully prosecuted 26 international cartels.63 
Therefore, in the analysed period a significant shift took place in the focus of investigations—
from domestic to transnational antitrust violations. It also coincided with the emergence of the 
international consensus, in the 1990s, on the harmful nature of international hard-core (price-
fixing, or markets dividing) cartels and the spread of competition legislation around the globe. This 
was followed, in the next decade, by growing and intensifying inter-agency cooperation.64  
The number of private actions involving foreign defendants—as compared with public 
actions—would be higher. Private suits, which characterize the U.S. antitrust enforcement,65 are 
driven by the prospects of treble damages awards66 and not by any comity considerations. 
                                                          
60 In this vein Hammond, pointing to the prosecution of the international lysine cartel as the turning point. Scott D. Hammond, 
Charting New Waters in International Criminal Prosecutions, 1 (Address at the National Institute on White Collar Crime, March 
2, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/214861.pdf. The growth in the number of prosecutions of 
international cartels was an effect of securing foreign firms’ and witnesses’ cooperation through plea agreements, thereby obtaining 
access to foreign-based evidence. Gary R. Spratling, Negotiating the Waters of International Cartel Prosecutions, 1 (Thirteenth 
Annual National Institute On White Collar Crime, March 4, 1999), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/2275.pdf. 
61 The Division was more active in the period preceding the Reagan administration. For example, there were eight cases of 
international horizontal price-fixing in the 1970s, but only three such cases in the 1980s. See Joseph C Gallo, et al., Department of 
Justice Antitrust Enforcement, 1955—1997: An Empirical Study, 17 REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 75, 80, 98-99 (2000). 
62 Spratling, Attachment 1: Status Report On International Cartel Enforcement, supra n 60. 
63 That is a number of private international hard-core cartels. See Table 1 in Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 
Contemporary International Cartels and Developing Countries: Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy, 71 
ANTITRUST L. J. 801 (2004). 
64 Both formally, under the negotiated (usually bilateral) agreements, as well as informally, within the framework of virtual 
networks between agencies. See PAPADOPOULOS, supra n 1, at 145-204; Imelda Maher & Anestis S. Papadopoulos, Competition 
Agency Networks Around the World, in INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON COMPETITION LAW (Ariel Ezrachi ed., Edward 
Elgar 2012). 
65 The place of the private suits in the U.S. antitrust regime was best encapsulated by the Supreme Court—‘the purposes of the 
antitrust laws are best served by insuring that the private action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone contemplating business 
behavior in violation of the antitrust laws’. Perma Mufflers v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968). 
66 See below notes 79-80 and accompanying text.  
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Therefore, the likelihood of causing international tension and provoking foreign nations to 
participate as amici is greater, and—as discussed below—most of the identified foreign states’ 
briefs were filed in private suits, be it stand alone or follow-on cases.67 
When it comes to public enforcement foreign states’ interests would often have been taken 
into account on an a priori basis. In cases brought by the U.S. antitrust agencies, which exercise 
prosecutorial discretion, there is scope for filtering out potential friction.68 Any remaining 
controversies (in the perception of other nations) would concern issues in regard to which the U.S. 
authorities had particularly strong views. This may explain why there were only three cases of 
public enforcement involving foreign states’ amicus submissions (see Table 7 below), including 
only one criminal case—Nippon Paper.69  
The impact of the foreign states’ amicus briefs in particular cases is difficult to appraise. 
Courts do not state the reasons for their judgments in an unambiguous manner. They also tend not 
to ascribe any particular weight to amicus filings when a case outcome is amicus-friendly. 
Nevertheless, even in cases in which courts did not discuss or refer to amicus briefs in their 
opinions, it cannot be ruled out that arguments raised in such submissions did influence their 
judgement. 
1. Who are the foreign amici? 
In most of the analysed cases the foreign states which participated as amicus curiae were developed 
nations.70 The European Commission was the most frequent filer (eight participations), followed 
                                                          
67 This point was made recently by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in its brief submitted in 
Motorola Mobility, in which it opposed extraterritorial assertions sought by the private plaintiffs. The METI observed that ‘giving 
private U.S. attorneys, which do not bear responsibility in international diplomacy and cooperation, the right to interfere with 
Japanese governmental regulation of the Japanese market is troublesome.’ Brief of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
of Japan As Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 
2014 WL 5422011, 6 (7th Cir. 2014). 
68 The U.S. government in its Supplemental Brief in Motorola Mobility argued that ‘The United States carefully considers 
international comity and exercises prudence before bringing any antitrust enforcement actions that might implicate the interests of 
a foreign jurisdiction.’ Supplemental Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae, Motorola 
Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., Docket No 14-08003, Entry No 57, 10 (7th Cir. June 27, 2014). This point was cited in the 
court’s opinion. See Motorola Mobility, supra n 10. Motorola Mobility, arising from a foreign price-fixing of components 
subsequently implemented in goods sold in the U.S. and elsewhere, serves as a good illustration. Although four foreign nations 
intervened as amici in this case protesting against extraterritorial assertions sought in this private action for damages (see notes 97-
105 and accompanying text.), none of them opposed the U.S. criminal prosecution of firms and foreign executives involved. See 
United States v. Hui Hsiung, 758 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2015). 
69 U.S. v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997). 
70 The phrase ‘developed nations’ is used deliberately to describe a group of developed and newly industrialized countries more 
closely interlinked through trade and investment flows, rather than any geographical indication. This group includes countries in 
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by Canada and Japan (seven participations each) and the UK (six participations). There were only 
four cases in which other states submitted briefs. Firstly, there was South Africa’s participation in 
the Uranium litigation,71 a litigation ongoing in the late 70s, alongside Australia, Canada and the 
UK. Secondly, there were two OPEC cases (Prewitt72 and Spectrum Stores73), decided in 2003 and 
2011, in which a number of petroleum producing nations participated. Finally, there was also the 
recent Vitamin C case,74 in which China filed amicus briefs—for the first time ever before a U.S. 
court. 
Table 4 Foreign States Amici: in Search for the Most Frequent Filer  
Foreign State 
Number of cases in which 
it participated 
EC 8 
Canada, Japan (including JFTC) 7 
UK 6 
Australia (including ACCC),  4 
Belgium (including the Belgian Competition Authority), 
Germany 
3 
Kuwait, Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, 
Venezuela 
2 
Algeria, Angola, Austria, China, France, Indonesia, Iraq, 
Ireland, Korea (KFTC), Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Qatar, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, United 
Arab Emirates 
1 
One possible partial explanation of the more frequent submissions of developed nations in 
antitrust cases is the fact that firms operating in such states would more often do business in and 
affect the markets of the U.S. than firms based in other parts of the world. Hence, developed nations 
had more interests at stake. This might partly reflect the North-South divide—between nations in 
which firms have the capacity to trade globally, and the rest of the world. 
                                                          
North America, Europe, and East and Southeast Asia (including Korea and Taiwan, but not China), as well as Australia and New 
Zealand. 
71 See notes 112-113 and accompanying text. 
72 Prewitt Enterprises v. OPEC (Prewitt II), 353 F.3d 916 (11th Cir. 2003). 
73 Spectrum Stores, supra n 52. 
74 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, supra n 12. 
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From a practical perspective one is likely to sue a foreign entity only when the prospects for 
successful enforcement (effective relief) are realistic. One of the greatest challenges of 
transnational litigation is gaining access to evidence, which may be located abroad. This applies 
to both public and private enforcement.75 In the former case, until the late 1990s—in order to obtain 
evidence and facilitate effective investigation of international cartels—the DoJ was often settling 
for fines instead of seeking indictments in exchange for cooperation (‘no-jail’ deals).76 
In the private actions context, prior to bringing a case plaintiffs need to consider, apart from 
the issue of handling discovery, the potential for recovery of any damages awards. When foreign 
entities have assets in the U.S., this issue is generally not problematic.77 In rarer cases—where 
there are no assets in the U.S. from which the plaintiffs could collect, the situation gets more 
complex. Under international law there is no obligation to recognize and enforce foreign money 
judgments. The U.S. concluded no agreement on mutual recognition and enforcement of 
judgments.78 Hence, this is a matter to be determined by a foreign court in the state of the sought 
recognition. Moreover, the U.S. is one of just a few jurisdictions worldwide which provide for 
multiple damages awards.79 Internationally (even among U.S. allies) there has been and still 
remains a level of mistrust towards U.S. treble damages awards.80 It seems reasonable to expect 
                                                          
75 For analysis in the context of transnational public enforcement see Marek Martyniszyn, Inter-Agency Evidence Sharing in 
Competition Law Enforcement, 19 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE AND PROOF 11 (2015). 
76 First time announced in Spratling. This policy changed in the late 1990s. In the international vitamin cartel case—for the 
first time—a foreign national participating in an international cartel agreed to serve a jail sentence. Plea Agreement, United States 
v. Sommer, Crim. No. 3:99-CR-201-R, para 9 (N.D. Tex. 1999), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f2400/sommer.pdf. 
Since then DoJ always required foreign cartelist to serve sentences. The DoJ Antitrust Division also started looking for extradition 
of foreigners. The first successful extradition on an antitrust charge took place on 3 April 2014. The Division managed to extradite 
an Italian national from Germany, who subsequently pleaded guilty and was sentenced to serve two years in prison for participating 
in the international marine hose cartel. U.S. Department of Justice, Former Marine Hose Executive Who Was Extradited to United 
States Pleads Guilty for Participating in Worldwide Bid-Rigging Conspiracy (April 24, 2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2014/305376.pdf. In 2010 the Division secured its first ever extradition of a 
foreigner—a British national Ian Norris—in the carbon products price-fixing investigation. Yet, Norris was extradited on 
obstruction of justice, not antitrust charges. For more on that case and the scope for extradition in antitrust see Philipp Girardet, 
‘What if Uncle Sam wants you?’: Principles and Recent Practice Concerning US Extradition Requests in Cartel Cases, 1 JOURNAL 
OF EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW & PRACTICE 286 (2010). 
77 The situation may be more complicated if the anticompetitive conduct is attributable to a foreign sovereign itself. For 
discussion see Marek Martyniszyn, FOREIGN STATE’S ENTANGLEMENT IN ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT (2015). 
78 See http://travel.state.gov/content/travel/english/legal-considerations/judicial/enforcement-of-judgments.html. 
79 Multiple damages awards are also available in private actions, for example, in Taiwan (Art. 32 of the Fair Trade Act) and 
in Panama (Art. 30 of the Law 45/2007 on the Protection and Defence of Competition). 
80 For example, the German Supreme Court held that multiple damages awards could not be enforced in Germany, given their 
punitive nature; and refused to recognise a judgement of the Superior Court of the State of California. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] 4 
June 1992, 118 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 312 (F.R.G.). Similarly, punitive damages are 
not available in Japan. The Japanese Supreme Court refused to recognize and enforce the part of the U.S. damages award which 
was exemplary and punitive finding that it would be against Japanese public policy. Ore. State Union No-so-kon I v. Mansei Ko-
gyo Co., Judgment of Supreme Court on July 11, 1997, Minshu 51-6-2573. In fact, in the past many states introduced legislation 
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that successful recovery is more likely in a forum which has a generally similar regulatory system 
to the U.S. Therefore, few foreign nations’ amicus filings of other than developed nations reflect 
generally lower numbers of private actions brought against defendants based in such states, which 
can be partly explained by a lower likelihood of effective recovery. 
Some of the foreign states’ briefs were filed not by the foreign governments in the strict sense, 
but by individual ministries,81 raising the question of the attributability of the represented views to 
respective states. Under customary international law ‘the conduct of any organ of a state must be 
regarded as an act of that state’.82 Yet, there may be more complex situations (for example, 
involving assertions contradicted by acts or policies of other organs of the same state) necessitating 
particular prudence in their treatment.83 
Albeit most of the analysed amicus briefs were submitted by foreign nations, the most frequent 
filer was the European Commission (eight participations), acting in its capacity as the competition 
agency of the European Union. These submissions represent a new phenomenon, emerging in 
recent years, of foreign competition agencies beginning to use amicus briefs to communicate their 
views directly to U.S. courts. Such agencies tend to enjoy at least a certain, and in some 
jurisdictions a considerable, degree of independence from home governments and therefore their 
representations are particularly noteworthy. Apart from the EC, amicus briefs were submitted also 
by Australian, Belgian, Japanese and Korean competition agencies.  
The representations made by the agencies tend to be less formalistic than those made by 
governments. Foreign agencies often present their views in letters to the judge hearing the case. 
These are de facto amicus briefs. Agencies probably opt for such a form because it is more 
expeditious and cheaper than filing a formal amicus. Moreover, a formal brief may necessitate 
                                                          
blocking recognition and enforcement of multiple damages awards and even introduced provisions allowing for recovery of any 
damages paid under such judgments. Much of such legislation was introduced in response to the Uranium litigation. For analysis 
see Marek Martyniszyn, Legislation Blocking Antitrust Investigations and the September 2012 Russian Executive Order, 37 WORLD 
COMPETITION 103 (2014). 
81 For example, that was the case with the submission by the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry in Zenith 
Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. and with the communications by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce in Vitamin 
C, Jury Verdict, In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, supra n 74. See notes 137-141, 24-27 and accompanying text. 
82 Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur, [1999] ICJ Rep, para 62. 
83 See further discussion of deference due to amicus briefs in Section 3. 
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going through a more stringent intra-agency process, whereas submission of a letter to a judge may 
only require the attention of a head of unit within the agency. 
Submissions of foreign antitrust agencies are another indicator of continuing juridification of 
transnational legal disputes. They suggest growing trust in and progressing understanding of each 
other’s legal processes. To file a brief, a foreign agency must have a certain level of trust in U.S. 
procedures and believe that a U.S. court will consider its arguments. Otherwise, it would likely 
seek an intervention at the executive level with a view to soliciting U.S. government intervention 
before the court hearing the case.  
2. Distinguishable strands of cases 
Analysis of foreign states’ amicus submissions from the perspective of their focus allows the 
identification of a few general strands of cases. These are cases dealing with: (1) jurisdiction and 
permissible limits of transnational application of U.S. antitrust laws, (2) discoverability of 
documents related to foreign antitrust investigations,84 (3) foreign states’ involvement in 
anticompetitive conduct, (4) regulation of exploitation of natural resources (see Table 5 below).  
Table 5 Issues Raised in Foreign States’ Amicus Briefs 
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No Year Case Name 
1 1978 Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India 1          
2 1980 In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation 5          
3 1981 Conservation Council of Western Australia, Inc. v. Alcoa 1          
4 1983 Washington Public Power Supply System v. Western Nuclear 1          
5 1986 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. 5          
6 1990 Karsten Mfg. Corp. v. U.S. Golf Ass'n 1          
7 1993 
Rivendell Forest Products Ltd. v. Canadian Forest Products 
Ltd. 
1          
8 1994 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California 2          
                                                          
84 This category is distinguished here as a separate one, although it is—in essence—a special case of the limits of 
enforcement jurisdiction in the transnational context. 
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9 1997 US v. Nippon Paper Industries Co. 1          
10 2002 In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation 3          
11 2002 In re: Methionine Antitrust Litigation 1          
12 2003 Prewitt Enterprises, Inc. v. OPEC 6          
13 2004 F. Hoffmann- La Roche Ltd v. Empagran  8          
14 2004 In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation 1          
15 2004 Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices Inc. 1         
16 2005 U.S. v. Gosselin World Wide Moving, N.V. 1          
17 2006 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. U.S. 1          
18 2007 In re Monosodium Glutamate Antitrust Litigation 1          
19 2007 In re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litigation 1          
20 2007 Goss Intern. Corp. v. Man Roland Druckmaschinen AG 1          
21 2008 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation 1          
22 2008 In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litigation 1          
23 2010 In re Payment Card Interchange Fee Antitrust Litigation 1          
24 2011 Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. 13          
25 2011 In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation 2          
26 2011 In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation 1          
27 2012 In re Flat Glass II Antitrust Litigation 1          
28 2015 Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. 4          
Foreign states filed briefs in antitrust cases before U.S. courts when their important interests 
were at stake. In most, if not all, cases such an interest was, in essence, the protection of foreign 
states’ own prerogatives—their power to regulate and govern activities of their subjects in a 
sovereign manner. This was the issue in all the cases focusing on extraterritoriality in antitrust.85 
Various states, especially the UK, argued against extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws, 
always noting that the conduct at stake was already regulated in the defendants’ home jurisdictions. 
They perceived U.S. extraterritoriality—the reaching for foreign defendants with often no presence 
or no business in the U.S.—as encroaching on their powers; a de facto exportation of U.S. 
legislation. From this perspective, they argued—at least initially—in favour of an international 
legal order of exclusive and exhaustive jurisdiction of states rather than an order of overlapping 
and concurrent powers. The more recent submissions call more for a greater accommodation of 
each other’s important interests, implicitly recognizing that concurrent jurisdiction is here to stay. 
                                                          
85 In similar vein DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL & WILLIAM M. KNIGHTON, NATIONAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE: THE 
PROBLEM OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY 9-10 (the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Routledge & Kegan Paul 1982). 
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Similar reasoning applies to recent cases dealing with discoverability of leniency-related 
materials. The amici argued that the sought discovery would undermine their own important 
policies—their leniency programs.86 Similar considerations were raised in cases concerning state 
involvement in the challenged conduct or in actions concerning exploitation of natural resources. 
In these latter few cases the opposition against applicability of U.S. antitrust laws to such activities 
was particularly forceful. 
The protection of one’s own prerogatives was not undertaken for its own sake. The legislative 
choices and policies have clear impact on national economies. The acceptance of foreign 
prescriptions may negatively affect the competitiveness of domestic businesses. It creates an 
additional cost. Moreover, in the context of U.S. antitrust actions, it is also the question of exposure 
to private suits and treble damages, which may not be available in the foreign defendants’ home 
states.87 In fact, some foreign nations’ amicus curiae submissions may be, in essence, mercantilist. 
They may be motivated directly by the interests of defendants. The amicus briefs may be submitted 
in order to shield the foreign defendants from liability in the U.S., even if their conduct was 
anticompetitive. From a pragmatic perspective, fines or damages in a transnational context 
represent a transfer of wealth from home to a foreign jurisdiction and therefore should be avoided. 
Given the significant inter-linkages between major economies, it is unlikely that any nation would 
be pursuing a purely mercantilist agenda, yet its echoes may nevertheless be heard in some acts or 
policies, including in representations made in the form of amicus curiae briefs. Suffice it to note 
that although there is now an international consensus as to the harmful nature of price-fixing 
agreements, most jurisdictions (including the U.S.) tolerate, if not encourage, export cartels, that 
is anticompetitive agreements which affect only foreign markets.88 Such considerations need to be 
taken into account when analyzing amicus curiae briefs of foreign nations. 
 
                                                          
86 See below n 106.  
87 Many jurisdictions which enacted and enforce competition laws do not provide for their private enforcement, relying 
exclusively on public enforcement efforts. The European Union only recently created the general framework facilitating pursuit of 
private damages claims arising from anticompetitive conduct. European Commission, IP/14/1580, Antitrust: Commission 
Welcomes Council Adoption of Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions (November 10, 2014), available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1580_en.htm. 
88 For discussion see Marek Martyniszyn, Export Cartels: Is it Legal to Target Your Neighbour? Analysis in Light of Recent 
Case Law, 15 J. INT'L ECON. L. 181 (2012). 
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2.1. Extraterritoriality and jurisdictional limits  
Application of U.S. antitrust law in a transnational context—to foreign entities—was the issue 
which led to multiple foreign states’ amicus filings. Initially these submissions aimed at opposing 
U.S. extraterritorial assertions in antitrust based on the Aloca’s effects doctrine89 as such. The UK 
was particularly active in this regard. The recurring objections to U.S. jurisdictional assertions are 
not surprising from the international law perspective, since a protest to be effective (and have the 
capacity of preventing recognition of a new customary norm) must be maintained and actively 
manifested.90 Later a shift took place from contesting extraterritoriality in itself towards demarking 
its internationally permissible limits. In other words, U.S. extraterritoriality in antitrust gradually 
became uncontested. 
Hartford Fire91 and Nippon Paper92  are the last cases in which extraterritoriality itself was 
challenged. Hartford Fire was a civil case brought by 19 U.S. states and private plaintiffs after the 
DoJ declined to prosecute it.93 Nippon Paper was the first criminal case in which antitrust laws 
were applied extraterritorially in circumstances when all the relevant conduct took place outside 
the U.S.94 In later cases, as exemplified by Empagran,95 the courts have dealt with more 
complicated factual and legal situations. 
                                                          
89 United States v. Aluminium Company of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945). In Alcoa, a case concerning an 
international cartel of aluminum producers, Judge Learned Hand formulated the effects doctrine by famously stating it was ‘settled 
law’ that states may apply their laws to foreign entities for their foreign conduct if it affects the domestic market, thereby setting a 
precedent and allowing for a far-reaching transnational enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws. The holding in Alcoa was, most likely, 
contrary to international law, yet at that time no foreign state protested. Rosenthal and Knighton noted that ‘until a decade after 
Alcoa was decided, the [U.S.] was virtually alone in promoting the effects doctrine as a valid basis for claiming the right to apply 
its antitrust law to regulate conduct beyond its borders. Virtually every other developed nation was in opposition.’ ROSENTHAL & 
KNIGHTON, supra n 85, at 3. 
90 See below n 179 and accompanying text.  
91 Hartford Fire, supra n 4. 
92 Nippon Paper, supra n 69. 
93 Michael F Brockmeyer, State Antitrust Enforcement, 57 ANTITRUST L. J. 169 (1988). 
94 Joseph P. Griffin, Foreign Governmental Reactions to US Assertions of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 19 ECLR 64, 68-69 
(1998). 
95 Empagran, supra n 5. The case arose from private class actions against an international price-fixing vitamin cartel, following 
successful public enforcement in the U.S. and other jurisdictions. The question was whether U.S. jurisdiction extends to claims of 
foreign purchasers from a global cartel that operated also in the U.S. In other words, whether the doors to the U.S. courtrooms (and 
treble damages awards) are open to all victims of global conspiracies. The Supreme Court had to construe the 1982 Foreign Trade 
Antitrust Improvements Act. Ultimately, the Court answered in the negative, in line with representations made by numerous foreign 
states’ amici, although it delivered its ruling in the context of a carefully and very narrowly framed scenario. 
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In the longer-term the trend to further challenge the limits of extraterritoriality in antitrust is 
bound to continue, since—as earlier indicated96—the generous U.S. rules on damages and 
plaintiffs-friendly discovery provide strong incentives for private plaintiffs to keep testing them. 
Amicus briefs will remain a tool which foreign states will be using to intervene and protest when 
deemed necessary.  
The recent Motorola Mobility case is the best example of this with four foreign nations getting 
involved as amici curiae. The U.S. plaintiff sued foreign cartelists for fixing prices of components 
which were incorporated by the plaintiff’s foreign affiliates into products which were subsequently 
sold by the plaintiff in the U.S. As in Empagran97 the crux was the interpretation of the poorly 
worded Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA). The case first led to the filing of an 
amicus brief by the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) arguing against 
the extraterritorial assertions sought by the plaintiff.98 The District Court found that under the 
FTAIA U.S. jurisdiction does not extend to such claims.99 The decision was affirmed on 
interlocutory appeal.100 Finding to the contrary would have—in Judge Posner’s words—
‘enormously increase[d] the global reach of the Sherman Act, creating friction with many foreign 
countries’.101 
The decision was later vacated and rehearing was ordered. This led to further interventions of 
foreign nations. The Taiwanese Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Korean Fair Trade 
Commission filed briefs opposing the far-reaching extraterritorial assertions as sought by the 
plaintiff.102 Notably, the defendants in this case were based in these three foreign jurisdictions. 
Afterwards, the Belgian Competition Authority also made a submission, joining the foreign amici 
                                                          
96 See above text accompanying n 65. 
97 Empagran, supra n 5. 
98 Brief of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan As Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 2013 WL 7098182 (N. D. Ill. 2013). 
99 Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 2014 WL 258154 (N. D. Ill. 2014). 
100 Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 746 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2014). 
101 Id. at 846. 
102 Brief of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Republic of China, Taiwan, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 
Docket No 14-08003, Entry No 47 (7th Cir. February 25, 2014); Brief of the Korea Fair Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae in 
Support of Appellees' Opposition to Rehearing En Banc, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 2014 WL 2583475 (7th 
Cir. 2014). 
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in their opposition.103 The Japanese METI filed another brief.104 The case involved also the U.S. 
government’s foreign amici participation in support of neither party. Ultimately, the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed its earlier opinion.105 In an amicus-friendly manner, the plaintiff was found to be 
unable to sue foreign price-fixers under U.S. antitrust law for overcharges paid by its foreign 
subsidiaries in relation to their foreign transactions. However, the Court’s reading of the FTAIA 
does not, in any way, limit the scope for extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law by the 
government agencies in such cases. 
2.2. Discoverability of documents related to foreign proceedings 
The emergence of foreign antitrust agencies’ amicus curiae submissions is a new development. 
Within the analyzed period ten cases involved such representations (see Table 6 below). But for 
Intel v. AMD and Motorola Mobility, foreign agencies—mostly, but not only the European 
Commission—filed briefs at the district court level. All submissions but for two (both filed in 
Motorola Mobility) concerned discoverability of documents related to foreign amici’s own 
antitrust investigations within the framework of leniency programs.106 The foreign amici 
participated to protect their policies’ credibility. The documents, in which discoverability for the 
sake of U.S litigation was contested, while held by the parties were at the same time considered at 
least confidential in the foreign fora. As noted above, in a broader sense the issue of discoverability 
falls within the notion of enforcement jurisdiction.107 
 
 
                                                          
103 Brief of the Belgian Competition Authority as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees' Position Seeking Affirmation of the 
District Court's Order, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 2014 WL 5422010 (7th Cir. 2014). 
104 Brief of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan As Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp, supra n 67. 
105 Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp., 773 F.3d 826 (7th Cir. 2014). This decision was amended and superseded 
by Motorola Mobility., cert. denided 135 S.Ct. 2837 (Mem). 
106 Leniency programs incentivise members of anticompetitive practices to cooperate with antitrust agencies in exchange for 
more lenient treatment or full immunity. Nicolo Zingales, European and American Leniency Programmes: Two Models Towards 
Convergence?, 5 COMPETITION LAW REVIEW 5 (2008). 
107 Hence it also raises the question of the permissible limits of U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction, albeit in its enforcement and 
not in the prescriptive sense. 
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Table 6 Foreign Antitrust Agencies as Amicus Curiae before U.S. Courts 
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No Year Case Name Amicus 
1 2002 In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation EC, ACCC†   ? 
2 2002 In re: Methionine Antitrust Litigation EC    
3 2004 Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices Inc. EC     
4 2007 In re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litigation EC    
5 2008 In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litigation Canada*    
6 2010 
In re Payment Card Interchange Fee Antitrust 
Litigation 
EC    
7 2011 In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation EC, JFTC    
8 2011 In re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation EC    
9 2012 In re Flat Glass II Antitrust Litigation EC    
10 2015 Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp. 
KFTC,  
Belgian NCA 
 +/-‡  
† ACCC did not file a formal amicus brief. The defendants submitted an affidavit of ACCC’s Chief 
Executive Officer. Since it was a statement created for the purposes of this litigation and served as a de 
facto amicus brief it is included in this listing. 
* The brief was formally filed by the Attorney General of Canada, but it represents the interests of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions and the Competition Bureau (as explicitly stated in its first paragraph), 
and hence it is included in this listing. 
‡ The brief of the U.S. was submitted in support of neither party.  
 
Foreign antitrust agencies were reasonably successful in convincing U.S. courts that the 
sought discovery should at least be limited in scope. This might have been facilitated by the 
requirement, under Aerospatiale,108 to consider foreign interests before ordering extraterritorial 
discovery. However, the foreign amici did not manage to convince U.S. courts to adopt a general 
rule against discoverability of such documents.109 Given the frequent representations of foreign 
antitrust agencies before U.S. courts on this matter (as compared with other issues raised by them 
in the same period), the issue of discoverability of foreign investigations-related documents 
                                                          
108 In re Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. 522 (1987). 
109 See also discussion in SPENCER WEBER WALLER & ANDRE FIEBIG, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD § 14:26 
(West Group 2014). 
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emerges as one of the most topical issues in international antitrust, calling for its more systemic 
resolution.110 
3. The issue of deference  
A foreign state is no ordinary amicus filer. Firstly, it is best placed to comment on its own laws, 
procedures, and policies. Secondly, its public statements—such as amicus briefs—are unilateral 
acts under international law. They may serve as a reference point in determining rules of customary 
international law.111 Therefore, their relevance extends beyond a particular case. Moreover, from 
the practical perspective the way of handling foreign states’ submissions may have spillover effects 
in international relations. 
The latter issue transpired in the Uranium litigation.112 In this politically charged case a number 
of foreign nations filed briefs at the district court level. The foreign defendants defaulted and the 
court entered judgments against them. In this context, on appeal—after further amicus 
representations had been made—the judge commented that the defaulters instead of defending 
their case chose ‘to present their entire case through surrogates ... and shockingly to us, the 
governments of the defaulters have subserviently presented for them their case’.113  
That comment led to a formal intervention of the Legal Adviser of the State Department in 
the Justice Department and subsequent communication between the U.S. Associate Attorney 
General and the 7th Circuit Court.114 The Assistant Attorney General underlined that since the 
change of practice regarding presentation of foreign states’ views before U.S. courts in 1978115 the 
                                                          
110 See further Caroline Cauffman, The Interaction of Leniency Programmes and Actions for Damages, 7 COMPETITION LAW 
REVIEW 181 (2011). 
111 For example, in the recent InnoLux case before the Court of Justice of the European Union the Advocate General Wathelet, 
in his advisory opinion, when dealing with the question of territorial scope of application of EU law referred to the amicus brief 
submitted by the Belgian competition authority in Motorola Mobility, calling for restrictive interpretation in accordance with the 
principle of international comity. The AG Wathelet noted also similar submissions made in that case by Taiwan and Japan. Case 
C-231/14 P, Opinion of Advocate General Wathelet in case InnoLux v. Commission. 
112 Uranium Litigation. The case concerned an international cartel of uranium producers, created under patronage of foreign 
governments in response to the U.S. ban on importation of uranium. ROSENTHAL & KNIGHTON, supra n 85, at 20. The Justice 
Department initiated an extensive grand jury investigation yet it ultimately refrained from seeking any incitements of foreign 
companies or individuals. The following controversies and foreign states’ amicus participations concerned private suits, which 
were eventually settled out of court. DEBORA L. SPAR, THE COOPERATIVE EDGE: THE INTERNAL POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
CARTELS 121 (Cornell University Press 1994). 
113 Uranium Litigation, supra n 32, at 1256. 
114 Letter from the U.S. Associate Attorney General John H. Shenfield to Clerk of the U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Thomas 
F. Strubbe, including the Letter from the Legal Adviser of the Deparment of State Roberts B. Owen to the U.S. Associate Attorney 
General John H. Shenfield (March 18, 1980), on file with the author. 
115 See discussed in Section III.1. 
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State and Justice Departments have ‘consistently encouraged’ foreign governments to submit their 
views directly to courts. The Legal Adviser was more explicit, underlining that the ‘language [of 
the Court] has caused serious embarrassment to the [U.S.] in its relations with some of [its] closest 
allies.’ He noted that the contentious issues ‘transcend[ed] the particular case or the interests of 
the defaulting companies’ and that the encouragement of foreign states’ amicus filings was ‘rooted 
in important considerations of public policy’. The Legal Adviser concluded that ‘it is [the State 
Department’s] belief that in future proceedings in this and other cases, the court should give due 
consideration to the views of interested foreign governments and take into account appropriate 
considerations of comity where there is possible conflict between the laws or policies of nation 
states’. The importance of due deference was later restated in a ‘formal statement of interests’ filed 
on remand by the U.S. Associate Attorney General.116 The statement recognized that the views 
presented by foreign states in amicus briefs ‘are entitled to appropriate deference and weight in 
resolving legal questions that turn, at least in part, on considerations of international comity.’117 
The Uranium litigation was settled.118 Shortly afterwards another similar private suit was 
brought against a number of U.S. and UK defendants.119 The UK government submitted an amicus, 
protesting against the extraterritorial assertion.120 The State Department filed its own statement of 
interests, aware of the affront to foreign states in the earlier case.121 It underlined that filing an 
amicus brief is the appropriate mechanism for foreign states to communicate their views to U.S. 
courts. It warranted that ‘serious foreign relations concerns could arise if those governments 
[whose interests were involved] were denied a means of communicating their views to the 
judiciary.’ Referring to the earlier case of Timberlane,122 the note pointed out that in cases 
                                                          
116 Letter of John H. Shenefield, Associate Attorney General to Hon. Prentice H. Marshall of May 6, 1980, reprinted in 5 
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) ¶50,416 (Transfer Binder 1969-1983). 
117 Id., citations omitted. 
118 SPAR, supra n 112, at 121. 
119 Washington Public Power Supply System v. Western Nuclear, No. C81-1362M (W.D. Wash. 1983). 
120 Extracts of the brief are reprinted in Geoffrey Martson, United Kingdom Materials on International Law 1982, 53 BYIL 
337, 455-58 (1983). 
121 The important parts of the Department of State statement of interests were reprinted in Marian Lloyd Nash, Contemporary 
Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 77 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 135, 136-37 (1983). 
122 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977). This was one of the first cases 
since Alcoa, in which a U.S. courts explicitly recognized the necessity of accommodating foreign states’ interests when asserting 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in antitrust. That approach was shared more broadly by the U.S. legal community. It was reflected in 
the influential Foreign Relations Law Restatement. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD): FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES Sections 402 and 403 (American Law Institute Publishers 1987). 
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perceived by foreign states as affecting their sovereign interests and in which comity 
considerations are relevant as a matter of law ‘the views and representations of the foreign 
government should be afforded appropriate deference and weight’. 
The U.S. government’s reactions to the treatment of foreign states’ amicus briefs sent a clear 
signal. Irrespective of whether a court shares the views presented by a foreign state, such 
communications are, at the minimum, to be handled in a respectful manner. If pertaining to issues 
of international comity, such filings are entitled to a level of deference. 
Similar issues reemerged in Matsushita,123 a protracted case involving allegations of predatory 
pricing of Japanese imports. In 1975, when the case was pending before the district court, the 
Japanese government presented its views on the underlying issues of Japanese law and policy (also 
regarding state compulsion) in a statement passed on to the court via diplomatic channels. While 
the lower court acknowledged the Japanese position, the Court of Appeals dealt with the case—to 
use the language of the Japanese government from its brief filed before the Supreme Court—‘never 
mentioning [the statement] and disregarding its contents’.124 Japan protested, arguing that ‘formal 
representations of foreign governments concerning their sovereign acts are to be given conclusive 
effect.’ It claimed that ‘once a friendly foreign nation has declared the substance and scope of its 
own domestic law and governmental activity, a United States court is to respect that declaration.’125  
Australia, Canada, France and the UK filed a joint amicus in this case—the first ever joint 
foreign states’ submission before U.S. courts.126 Unlike in most other cases, the amici were not the 
defendants’ home states. These were the states which experienced an affront in the Uranium 
litigation.127 They participated in Matsushita out of ‘great concern’ over ‘the refusal of the Court 
of Appeals … to give dispositive weight to, or even to acknowledge’ the Japanese 
representations.128 They considered it ‘inconsistent with the fundamental international legal 
principle of mutual respect of the sovereignty of friendly foreign governments within their own 
                                                          
123 Matsushita, supra n 3. 
124 Brief of the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petition for A Writ of Certiorari, Matsushita Electric 
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (Matsushita), supra n 25, at 4. 
125 Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief for the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioners, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (Matsushita), 1985 WL 669664, 7-8 (U.S. 1985). 
126 Joint Amicus Brief of Australia, Canada, France, and the UK in Matsushita, supra n 45. 
127 Australia, Canada and the UK filed the amicus brief, whereas France limited itself to diplomatic interventions.  
128 The foreign amici also supported the petitioners’ position on the foreign sovereign compulsion and act of state defences. 
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territory.’129 The amici argued that since the Supreme Court had in the past relied on statements of 
U.S. states, friendly foreign nations’ communications should be accorded at least the same 
weight,130 especially when focusing on their own regulatory actions or frameworks. They claimed 
that it would be unacceptable for a sovereign to have such matters determined by foreign courts.131 
The amici also argued that the act of state doctrine prohibited courts from adjudicating veracity of 
foreign governments’ official statements relating to issues of national policies.132 
The issue of deference was also discussed in Matsushita in the U.S. Solicitor General, Justice 
and State Departments’ joint submissions,133 which maintained that the Japanese brief should be 
accorded a dispositive weight.134 The position was that ‘once a foreign government presents a 
statement dealing with subjects within its area of sovereign authority … American courts are 
obligated to accept that statement at face value; the government's assertions concerning the 
existence and meaning of its domestic law generally should be deemed “conclusive.”’135 That was 
not to apply to ambiguous or inconsistent statements. Additionally, in the case of a representation 
which is ‘incredible on its face’ a court may have to inquire into the underlying circumstances out 
of concern for integrity of the judicial process.136  
Recently the question of deference prominently resurfaced in Vitamin C137—a private suit 
against a Chinese export cartel. While the allegations were not contested, the defendants argued 
that the conduct at stake was compelled by the Chinese authorities, enabling them to rely on a 
foreign state compulsion defense to avoid liability under U.S. antitrust laws.138 China139 filed an 
                                                          
129 Perhaps not incidentally, the joint foreign amici in Matsushita were the very same governments which were earlier involved 
in the Uranium Litigation. In their amicus they recalled the mistreatment of foreign states’ filings in that case and referred to the 
reaction of the State Department. 
130 Joint Amicus Brief of Australia, Canada, France, and the UK in Matsushita, supra n 45, at 7. 
131 Id. at 8. 
132 Id. at 10. 
133 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp. (Matsushita), 1985 WL 669663 (U.S. 1985); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (Matsushita), 1985 WL 669667 (U.S. 1985). 
134 First Amicus Brief of the U.S. in Matsushita, supra n 133, at 6, 17-18. 
135 Second Amicus Brief of the U.S. in Matsushita, supra n 133, at 23, citations omitted. 
136 Id. at 23. 
137 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, supra n 12. 
138 For more on this defence see Marek Martyniszyn, A Comparative Look on Foreign State Compulsion as a Defence in 
Antitrust Litigation, 8 COMPETITION LAW REVIEW 143 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1986032. 
139 All communications were formally presented on behalf of the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China in 
its capacity as a cabinet level department of the Chinese government. For the sake of simplicity these communications are referred 
to in this text as filings of China.  
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amicus, in which it explained the regulatory framework and acknowledged the alleged compulsion. 
It also argued that its brief should be given a dispositive effect. Ruling on the motion to dismiss 
the complaint, the court found that while the brief was entitled to substantial deference, it was not 
to be taken as conclusive in light of the submitted documentary evidence contradicting it.140 As the 
litigation developed, China submitted further communications. When requested to rule on the 
motion for summary judgment, the court considered that a foreign state’s submission is not entitled 
to ‘absolute and conclusive deference in all circumstances and that further inquiry behind [the] 
statement is permissible.’141 Having analyzed the Chinese submissions, the court declined to defer 
to them. It found that one of them did ‘not read like a frank and straightforward explanation of 
Chinese law. Rather, it [read] like a carefully crafted and phrased litigation position.’142 It seemed 
to be ‘a post-hoc attempt to shield defendants' conduct from antitrust scrutiny rather than a 
complete and straightforward explanation of Chinese law during the relevant time period in 
question.’143 When the case was moving to trial, the defendants sought to have the Chinese 
submissions presented as evidence. In this context, the court found ‘ample … reasons’ (among 
them lack of Chinese impartiality) to consider the filings untrustworthy,144 ultimately finding them 
inadmissible. The case went to trial and a jury found the defendants guilty of price-fixing.145 
On appeal, the judgement was vacated. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 
denial of the original motion to dismiss, ordering dismissal with prejudice on international comity 
grounds.146 It held that ‘when a foreign government … directly participates in U.S. court 
proceedings by providing a sworn evidentiary proffer regarding the construction and effect of its 
laws and regulations, which is reasonable under the circumstances presented, a U.S. court is bound 
to defer to those statements.’147 In the Second Circuit’s view deference rules out any challenge to 
                                                          
140 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, supra n 12.  
141 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 810 F.Supp.2d 522, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
142 Id. at 552. 
143 Id. The court also refused to permit an interlocutory appeal, also on the question of deference due to the Chinese 
submissions. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 2012 WL 425234 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
144 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation 2012 WL 4511308, 3 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). 
145 The defendants were ordered to pay over $150 million in treble damages. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 2013 WL 
3369106 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). 
146 Rather than focusing exclusively on the issue of foreign state compulsion, the Court of Appeals addressed this case through 
the prism of international comity, reading Hartford Fire narrowly and considering the issue of compulsion one of the factors which 
may warrant abstention from adjudication. In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 2016 WL 5017312 (2nd Cir. 2016). 
147 Id. at 9. 
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such foreign state’s representations regarding its laws or regulations.148 Hence, the Court adopted 
a very high standard of deference. Little guidance was offered on what criteria should be used in 
evaluating whether an interpretation of domestic rules proposed by a foreign government is to be 
seen as reasonable. However, the Court recognized that deference may be inappropriate when there 
is ‘no documentary evidence or reference of law’ supporting the proffered interpretation.149 In the 
pending case the Second Circuit considered the Chinese explanations of the contentious terms to 
be reasonable, despite the reservations made by the lower court. The application of the recognized 
high standard of deference led, in effect, to the finding that the Chinese authorities compelled the 
price-fixing of exports. Given the defendants’ impossibility to comply with both the Chinese and 
U.S. laws, the Second Circuit found that the lower court erred by not abstaining from adjudication. 
In Animal Science,150 a case against a Chinese export cartel of magnesite-based products 
producers, the defendants in their defense (the crux of which was the alleged state compulsion) 
relied on Chinese briefs in Vitamin C submitted at the lower court level. The district court found 
that a foreign state’s ‘admission of legal compulsion of its subjects might warrant a high—often, 
nearly binding—degree of deference’.151 In the case context it distinguished between: (1) the 
Chinese authorities’ statements regarding their own regulatory directives152 and (2) their 
interpretations of directives and statements made by others (in this case a subordinate chamber of 
commerce). The court held the former to be the final authority on the matter, unless disproved by 
Chinese legal provisions or other official statements. The latter were to be assessed in light of other 
evidence in order to clarify their reliability.153 The judgment was later vacated on other grounds.154 
These findings in Animal Science concerning deference were made while Vitamin C was ongoing. 
These recent cases involving Chinese defendants and the official communications of the Chinese 
government differently assessed by U.S. courts show that the issue of deference remains both 
practically important and still unresolved. 
                                                          
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 9, n 8. 
150 Animal Science Products v. China Nat. Metals & Minerals Import & Export Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 320 (D.N.J. 2010). 
151 Id. at 426. 
152 ‘It would be unseemly of this Court to claim that it could determine the scope or the goals of the [Chinese Ministry’s] 
directives … better than the [Ministry] itself.’ id. at 429. 
153 Id. 
154 Animal Science Products v. China Nat. Metals & Minerals Import & Export Corp., 2011-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P77,566 
(3rd Cir. 2011). 
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Difficulty of another type arose in Motorola Mobility,155 a private suit for damages against 
foreign price-fixers, which focused on the jurisdictional question. Four foreign states’ amici 
participated, among them the Japanese METI, protesting against the sought extraterritorial 
assertions, which were to unreasonably interfere with sovereign authority of other nations and 
violate international law.156 However, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) in Cathode Ray 
Tube, in 2009 and 2010, applied Japanese antimonopoly laws extraterritorially in an even more 
contentious context.157 This situation shows that different state organs may take different, 
potentially even contradicting positions on the same issue. In the amicus curiae context it requires 
courts to be observant and willing to seek further advice and necessary clarifications in case of any 
ambiguities. 
Antitrust cases in the U.S. are decided by general courts, which have to cope with challenges 
posed by often highly complicated factual matters. The relative growth in foreign states’ amicus 
filing puts additional strain on the U.S. judges. The lower courts, in particular, may not be 
acquainted with handling foreign sovereigns. When faced with foreign states’ submissions, courts 
should be respectful in the way they handle such engagement. Judges should be most 
accommodating, especially from a procedural perspective. A foreign state should be given ample 
opportunity to present its views and arguments. The current practice of lower courts in the U.S. 
offering foreign states more leeway in terms of the filing’s form (formal amicus briefs v. letters to 
the court, possibility of filing response briefs, etc.) or appearances (at the oral argument or in-court 
conferences) is a welcomed development.158 It is also natural that such flexibility decreases as the 
litigation moves into higher courts. While being stricter in terms of the form of a foreign state’s 
involvement, higher courts should remain cognizant of the special nature of foreign states’ amici. 
Even a perceived disrespect in the way in which such communications are handled may have 
                                                          
155 Motorola Mobility, supra n 10. 
156 For discussion in that context see notes 97-105 and accompanying text. 
157 The case concerned a South-East Asian cartel fixing prices of components used in televisions. Foreign subsidiaries of 
Japanese firms purchased the affected components outside Japan and the large majority of finished products was sold outside Japan. 
The JFTC had, nevertheless, fined a number of foreign cartelists and issued cease and desist orders. JFTC, Cease-and-Desist Order 
and Surcharge Payment Orders against Manufacturers of Cathode Ray Tubes for Televisions (October 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2009/oct/individual-000037.html; JFTC, Cease-and-Desist Order and Surcharge 
Payment Orders against Manufacturers of Cathode Ray Tubes for Televisions (follow-up report) (March 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/pressreleases/yearly-2010/mar/individual-000136.html. 
158 For example, in Vitamin C litigated in the District Court for E.D. New York China submitted a formal amicus brief as well 
as a number of follow-on statements, which were given the Court’s consideration. The case docket shows that it was also granted 
a general right to take part in conference hearings (without the need to secure permission each time) and that it had the Court’s 
assent to attend the oral argument. 
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unpalatable spillover effects, extending beyond a particular case. They may also include a similar, 
reciprocal treatment of the U.S. government by foreign courts.159  
However, foreign states’ statements which are prone to multiple interpretations or 
contradicted, directly or indirectly, by admissible evidence should be subject to further 
consideration. Independent expert advice should be sought in cases posing challenges relating to 
different regulatory regimes. Investigated submissions should carry such weight as is appropriate 
in light of any remaining interpretative doubts. Given that the past policy change (encouraging 
foreign states to express their views directly before U.S. courts)160 helped also to judicialize the 
process, there is no reason why foreign states’ assertions—from a factual perspective— should be 
given privileged treatment in the adjudicative process.  
4. The U.S. government’s participation 
The U.S government’s amicus submissions in antitrust cases represent discretionary decisions to 
become involved in private actions. The exceptions are the instances in which the Supreme Court 
seeks the government’s views before deciding on a petition for certiorari. Such invitations are 
always accepted.161 Sometimes lower courts also request to hear the views of the U.S. government, 
but these are rarer cases. For reasons of economy, the government’s participation is very selective. 
It is undertaken ‘solely to represent the public interest’.162 Drafts are normally first prepared by the 
Antitrust Division’s Appellate Section.163 After any consultations with other departments and 
agencies the Solicitor General revises and files the brief.164 
Among the analyzed 28 antirust cases there were eight cases in which the U.S. government 
participated as amicus and three cases brought by the DoJ (see Table 7 below). In all of these 
eleven cases, the outcome—on the point found contentious by the foreign amici—was in line with 
                                                          
159 As explicitly recognized in a State and Justice Departments amicus brief in Belize ‘The United States also has a significant 
interest in the treatment of foreign states in U.S. courts by virtue of the reciprocal treatment of the United States Government by 
the courts of other nations.’ Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendant-Appellant, Belize Telecom, Ltd. 
et al v. Government of Belize No. 05-12641-CC (11th Cir. 2005). Available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/2005/87217.htm. 
160 See Section III.1. 
161 Catherine G. O’Sullivan, Participation by the United States as Amicus Curiae in Private Antitrust Litigation: An Overview 
of the Process, 1-2 (US Department of Justice 2004), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/antitrust/at-committees/at-
state/pdf/programs/spring-04/saec-osullivan.pdf. 
162 Id. at 3-4. 
163 The Section prepares drafts of both the appellate and district court filings. Id. at 9. 
164 Id. at 2. 
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U.S. interests as represented by the U.S. government. This suggests that although the majority of 
internationally-contentious antitrust cases in which foreign states participated are private, the 
views of the U.S. carry significant weight and if presented to a court they are likely to be 
accommodated.165 This is certainly so in the case of submissions on questions of international law 
and foreign relations. Courts’ deference to the executive branch in this context may be explained 
by the desirability of the U.S. to speak with one voice and the fact that it is the executive branch 
which later may have to answer for any alleged breach of international law by the U.S.166 and any 
adverse consequences in its international dealings. The lack of U.S. involvement in a transnational 
case may—and should—be read by courts as a signal that the administration does not see a reason 
why the case deserves any special treatment.167 
The judiciary’s deference to the executive branch also suggests that the inter-governmental—
or in the antitrust context, inter-agency—communication is very important. Foreign states’ 
lobbying of and collaboration with the U.S. government (not only the DoJ but also other executive 
agencies) may preempt conflicts. It can significantly impact private actions if the U.S. government 
formally takes a stance supporting a foreign state’s arguments. It may influence public enforcement 
efforts by filtering out sensitive issues or controversial cases.168 That may be why there were only 
three cases of public enforcement in which foreign states submitted briefs. This potential of 
preempting controversies inter-governmentally is well-illustrated by both the older (such as the 
Uranium litigation169) and more recent cases. A good example of the latter are the Chinese export 
                                                          
165 Some authors argue that in the field of antitrust the Supreme Court’s decisions were predominantly in line with the U.S. 
government’s amicus filings, with some major exceptions, such as in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Michelle 
Messer, Regulating Antitrust as Amicus: The Government’s Role in Private Enforcement Actions Before the Supreme Court, 3-4 
(Yale Law School Student Prize Papers No. 23, 2007), available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/ylsspps_papers/23/. This is 
also in line with the general influence of the U.S. executive’s amicus briefs. For example, Segal concludes that ‘parties supported 
in amicus briefs by the solicitor general exhibit spectacular success rates in cases before the Supreme Court’. Jeffrey A. Segal, 
Amicus Curiae Briefs by the Solicitor General during the Warren and Burger Courts: A Research Note, 41 THE WESTERN POLITICAL 
QUARTERLY 135, 142 (1988). See also discussion in Ryan C Black & Ryan J Owens, The Solicitor General and the United States 
Supreme Court: Executive Influence and Judicial Decisions (2012), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/SG_Chicago_Paper-1.pdf. 
166 Eileen Denza, The Relationship between International and National Law in INTERNATIONAL LAW, 423 (Malcolm D. Evans 
ed., OUP 2014). 
167 This point is well-illustrated by the State Department response to the Australian request to take a position in Conservation 
Council. See n 22 and the accompanying text. 
168 From a public international law perspective, foreign state participation at such an early stage, if pertaining to questions of 
international law, can be seen as an anticipatory protest, which aims at influencing the conduct of the addressee. Krzysztof 
Skubiszewski, Unilateral Acts of States, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS, 227 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 
Martinus Nijhoff 1991).  
169 In this context see above notes 112-118 and accompanying text.  
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cartels’ cases.170 The conduct at stake was challenged in private actions, but it was not subject to 
any civil or criminal prosecution by the Justice Department. 171 
Table 7 U.S. Government Participation v. Case Outcome 
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No Year Case Name 
1 1978 Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India     
2 1986 Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.     
3 1994 Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California      
4 1997 US v. Nippon Paper Industries Co. P    
5 2004 F. Hoffmann- La Roche Ltd v. Empagran      
6 2004 Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices Inc.      
7 2005 U.S. v. Gosselin World Wide Moving, N.V. P    
8 2006 Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. U.S. P    
9 2011 Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.     
10 2012 In re Flat Glass II Antitrust Litigation     
11 2015 Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics Corp  +/-‡   
P = public enforcement 
‡ The brief of the U.S. was submitted in support of neither party 
 
V. Functions of foreign states’ amicus briefs 
Nation states—the prime actors in the international legal system—rarely appear before foreign 
national courts.172 Amicus curiae participation is one such exception.173 Foreign states’ amicus 
submissions serve a number of useful functions. They may facilitate adjudication and lead to 
better-informed outcomes. This is particularly so in transnational cases, in which appreciation of 
                                                          
170 See notes 137-154 and accompanying text.  
171 However, the U.S. challenged China also (but not only) for the same conduct in the World Trade Organization framework. 
WTO Appellate Body, China- Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WT/DS394/13, WT/DS395/13, 
WT/DS398/12 (December 8, 2011). See Martyniszyn, supra n 88, at 214-15. It can be also argued that the U.S. agencies did not 
bring criminal antitrust charges due to the applicable high standard of proof (beyond reasonable doubt), but they had also abstained 
from bringing a civil case, which would be subject to a lighter regime (preponderance of evidence). 
172 GERNOT BIEHLER, PROCEDURES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 185 (Springer 2008). 
173 States also appear before national courts with regard to their private or commercial activities (acta de jure gestionis). For 
more on this category of acts see HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY 35 (OUP 2nd ed, 2008). 
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foreign laws, procedures, and policies may be challenging. The foreign state itself is best equipped 
to explain and comment on its own measures. By providing such opportunities, some of the 
unnecessary friction in international relations may be avoided or at least decreased. Moreover, 
from a collaborative perspective, amicus briefs allow concerns to be voiced and considered on an 
ad hoc basis. This is a valuable function, even if only as a matter of good neighborliness.174 
Looking through the lens of international law, amicus briefs are unilateral acts of states.175 
They are one of the tools shaping international law, by expressing states’ understanding of the 
scope of existing and emerging principles and customary norms.176 Furthermore, such foreign 
states’ representations may constitute protest under international law (if pertaining to such 
questions),177 which in turn overcomes any assumption of acquiescence to or tolerance of a 
particular practice.178 A protest may influence the development of international law also by 
preventing recognition of a new customary norm.179 Hence amicus briefs’ significance may extend 
beyond individual cases and this potential has been recognized.180  
Similarly, a lack of a foreign state’s amicus participation in a suit presented by a party as 
endangering the foreign state’s important interests or contentious questions of international law 
may be read by courts as the lack of support of the raised claims or defences.181 Silence speaks 
volumes, especially in the case of states which are known to appear before U.S. courts.182 
                                                          
174 CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 207-08 (OUP 2008). 
175 For in-depth analysis of unilateral acts see Skubiszewski, supra n 168.  
176 Art. 38(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that international custom should constitute ‘evidence 
of a general practice accepted as law’. 
177 In this vein FOX, supra n 173, at 17-18. Arguments advanced in amicus briefs of natural or legal persons will not carry such 
significance under international law.  
178 For more on protest and acquiescence see MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 89-91 (CUP 6th ed, 2008); Christophe 
Eick, Protest, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., OUP online ed, 2006). 
179 Yet to have effect protest ‘must not only be explicit: it should be also maintained and it should manifest itself, whenever 
possible, in an active attitude.’ Skubiszewski, supra n 168, at 227. 
180 Ryngaert argues that ‘if States intend to oppose the crystallization of a norm of customary international law, they ought to 
object to any decision which might contain such a norm that might in future purportedly work to the detriment of their interests 
[emphasis in the original].’ This is also how Ryngaert explains amicus submissions of various states (protesting against overly far-
reaching U.S. extraterritorial tort jurisdiction) in Sosa. RYNGAERT, supra n 174, at 209, n 88. 
181 As one Court of Appeals observed in relation to an opposition to a discovery order ‘we are fully aware that when foreign 
governments … have considered their vital national interests threatened, they have not hesitated to make known their objections to 
the enforcement of a subpoena to the issuing court.’ U.S. v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 904 (2nd Cir. 1968). 
182 The same may not be true for states which do not practise filing amicus briefs, for example, due to limited resources or 
capacity constraints. 
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Moreover, amicus filings may be used as a point of reference in other actions and also against 
the state which originally filed them.183 In other words, a state which formulates a particular view 
in an amicus brief, may be later challenged if it itself acts contrary to that position in similar 
circumstances.184 
Amicus joint submissions carry additional weight since they already convey a common 
expression of understanding of contentious issues or—depending on context—a common protest. 
In other words, they express the coordinated positions of some states. Overall, foreign states’ 
amicus briefs are a useful tool in the on-going debate shaping international law and the emerging 
principles of international competition law. 
From a practical perspective, foreign states’ amicus submissions help to identify contentious 
issues. This applies especially to private actions in the U.S. In such a context plaintiffs are strongly 
incentivized (by rules on damages and discovery185) to venture into uncharted (and often foreign) 
waters by bringing to U.S. courts novel or controversial cases, which often would not be brought 
by agencies, generally more cognizant of foreign states’ interests and implementing their own 
policies. In this sense amicus briefs serve as a litmus test determining, for example, the limits of 
applicability of antitrust laws, whether prescriptive (regarding the ‘length’ of the U.S long-arm 
jurisdiction, or the subject-matter not covered or nonjusticiable) or relating to enforcement. 
Amicus briefs can be also seen as political documents, serving both foreign and domestic 
political ends. It cannot be precluded that a state participates as amicus before a U.S. court to meet 
expectations of some local constituencies or lobbying groups, but it does not—at the same time—
feel strongly about the contested issue and makes no attempt to intervene with the U.S. government 
to convince it to file a supporting brief. In this sense, amicus filings are also a political instrument, 
allowing governments to express disquiet, while allowing foreign legal processes to run their 
course. 
                                                          
183 As Skubiszewski notes ‘publicly made unilateral act can be invoked by all interested States’. Skubiszewski, supra n 168, 
at 232. 
184 For example, in Motorola Mobility the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry made a representation, which 
was largely contradicted by earlier expansive extraterritorial assertions of the Japanese Fair Trade Commission. See notes 155-157 
and accompanying text. This discrepancy was noted in the U.S. government’s initial submission in Motorola Mobility. 
Supplemental Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU 
Optronics Corp., Docket No 14-08003, at 7. 
185 See above n 65 and accompanying text.  
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VI. Conclusions  
Foreign states’ amicus curiae briefs submitted in U.S. antitrust cases sit on the intersection of 
competition and international law. In the analyzed period of 1978-2015, 67 such foreign nations’ 
participations in 28 cases have been identified and analyzed. The developed nations were the most 
frequent amicus filers, perhaps due to stronger economic ties with the U.S. or thanks to greater 
chances of effective relief against defendants based in such fora. Foreign states filed amicus briefs 
predominantly in private actions. This suggests that the U.S. agencies in their enforcement efforts 
are cognizant of and accommodating foreign states’ interests. Although most briefs were submitted 
by foreign governments, there is a noticeable trend of individual foreign ministries and antitrust 
agencies making such representations.  
Foreign states participated as amicus curiae before U.S. courts to protect their prerogatives, 
understood as power to regulate and govern activities of their subjects in a sovereign manner. The 
decisive majority of amicus briefs were submitted by home states of the defendants. Substantively, 
the issues which attracted attention and amicus filings were the question of jurisdiction, 
discoverability of foreign proceedings-related leniency documents, foreign states’ implication in 
anticompetitive conduct and regulation of exploitation of natural resources.  
A question which keeps reoccurring and which led to the first ever joint amicus submission 
of foreign states before U.S. courts is the matter of deference due to such filings. This issue remains 
unresolved with courts following different approaches. This article argues that such briefs should 
be handled in a respectful manner and foreign amici should benefit from considerable procedural 
flexibility. Yet, such submissions need not be accorded a dispositive effect. If prone to multiple 
interpretations or disputed by otherwise admissible evidence, courts should seek further 
clarification, independent expert advice and, if appropriate, call on the U.S. executive to hear its 
views on the contentious issues. Interestingly, the U.S. courts show a great deal of agreement with 
the executive branch. In the analyzed cases, in which the U.S. administration expressed its position, 
the outcomes were in line with this. 
Overall, amicus briefs are a versatile instrument, potentially serving various legal and political 
functions. They have the capacity to facilitate adjudication, influence development of international 
law (for example, by conveying protest), and serve domestic political ends without hampering 
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foreign legal processes. In more general terms, foreign nations’ amicus filings inform the debate 
on and deepen the understanding of the differences in law and policy between regimes (including 
particularly contentious issues). They also help to appreciate at which point competition laws give 
way to broader considerations of political economy and the realm of foreign relations. Over time 
a growing usage of amicus briefs by foreign states is noticeable. It suggests some, and possibly a 
growing, degree of trust in the U.S. adjudicative process and the creeping juridification of 
transnational antitrust disputes, even those affecting foreign states’ important interests. 
 
